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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-year-old Joanne N. Christofferson pleaded
guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter.

Ms. Christofferson filed an Idaho Criminal

Rule 12.2 (“Rule 12.2”) motion for additional defense services, requesting a
psychological examination to assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing. The district
court denied the Rule 12.2 motion. The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten
years, with five years fixed. On appeal, Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court
abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 12.2 motion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Idaho State Police officers responded to a fatal car versus motorcycle crash on
US 30 in Pocatello.

(Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.)1

At the scene,

witnesses told the officers the driver of the car, Ms. Christofferson, had been traveling
east when the car drove left of center into the westbound lane of traffic. (PSI, p.4.) The
car crashed head-on into a motorcycle that had been traveling west in the westbound
lane. (PSI, p.4.) The car then crashed into a fence located just north of the scene.
(PSI, p.4.) The driver of the motorcycle, Staci M. Shyrock, was deceased by the time
the officers arrived at the scene. (PSI, p.4.) Inside the car, an officer found a purse
containing a driver’s license with the name of Ms. Christofferson, a glass pipe with white
residue, and a prescription bottle with two different colored pills inside and the name of
Jennifer Reynolds on it. (PSI, p.5.)

All citations to the “PSI” refer to the 59-page PDF electronic version of the
presentence report and attachments.
1

1

Ms. Christofferson had been transported to the Portneuf Medical Center. (PSI,
pp.4-5.) Hospital staff found another glass pipe with residue on Ms. Christofferson’s
person, and she had reportedly told a nurse she had smoked marijuana before getting
into her car and driving.2

(PSI, p.5.)

The officers obtained a blood sample from

Ms. Christofferson, and then went back to the hospital with a search warrant to get more
blood from her. (PSI, p.5.) The police report stated “[t]he two methamphetamine pipes
and the blood will be sent to the Idaho State Police Laboratory for evidentiary
purposes.”3 (R., p.29.)
Ms. Christofferson had sustained injuries including a concussion and bruising.
(PSI, p.5.) Following her release from the hospital the day after the crash, officers
arrested her for vehicular manslaughter. (PSI, pp.5-6.)
The State charged Ms. Christofferson by Prosecuting Attorney’s Information with
vehicular manslaughter, felony, Idaho Code § 18-4006(3)(a) and/or § 18-4007(3)(a)
and/or (b), for acting with gross negligence and/or in the commission of a violation of
I.C. § 18-8004 or § 18-8006. (R., pp.55-56.)
guilty plea.

(R., p.71.)

Ms. Christofferson initially entered a not

A public defender was appointed to represent her, and

Ms. Christofferson later retained private defense counsel. (See R., pp.35, 95.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Christofferson agreed to plead guilty to an
Amended Information charging her with vehicular manslaughter under I.C. §§ 18-

Later, at the change of plea hearing, the State argued Ms. Christofferson had also
made statements to another individual at the hospital that “she had used
methamphetamine.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-17.) During the presentence investigation,
Ms. Christofferson stated she had used Clonazepam before the crash, but she did not
remember the crash itself. (See PSI, pp.8-9.)
3 At the change of plea hearing, the State argued “the lab results indicate multiple
controlled substances in the blood and urine of the defendant . . . .” (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3.)
2

2

4006(3)(a) and 18-4007(3)(a), for acting with gross negligence. (R., pp.115-18; 12127.)

In the Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Ms. Christofferson stated she had been

diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and anxiety.
Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.)

(R., p.123; see

The district court accepted Ms. Christofferson’s guilty plea.

(R., p.116; Tr., p.40, Ls.16-19.)
Ms. Christofferson then filed an Ex Parte Motion for Additional Defense Services.
(R., pp.128-30.)
(R., p.128.)

The motion was made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2.

Ms. Christofferson asserted that upon her discharge from the hospital

following the incident, “a comprehensive psychological evaluation was strongly
recommended by hospital staff in its discharge instructions. . . .

Hospital records

reveals a significant and complicated mental health history for Christofferson including
potential diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, bi-polar
disease and significant anxiety and stress due to circumstances in her life.” (R., p.129.)
Thus, Ms. Christofferson “would like to have a comprehensive psychological
examination to assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.” (R., p.129.)
The motion for additional defense services then stated counsel “would like to
engage Dr. John Christensen to perform those functions on behalf of Christofferson.”
(R., p.129.)

The motion provided Dr. Christensen’s rates, qualifications, and an

estimate of the total cost of services.

(R., p.129.)

The motion further asserted

Ms. Christofferson, even though she had retained private counsel “through the
resources of family members,” by that point had “no income or significant assets which
could be used to pay for the requested services.” (R., p.130.)

3

The district court later issued an Order Regarding Ex-Parte Motion for Additional
Defense Services. (R., pp.135-40.) The district court found “the request for these
additional services would be duplicative of what has already been ordered.” (R., p.136.)
The district court stated that, “[p]ursuant to Idaho Code (IC) § 19-2524 any defendant
who has been found guilty of a felony undergoes a screening to determine if they are in
need of an assessment for a substance abuse disorder and/or a mental health
evaluation.” (R., pp.136, 138.) The district court then stated, “[i]f it is determined from
the screening that further examination is necessary, the case is referred to the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare for a full assessment.” (R., p.138.) According to the
district court, “[a]s such, the defendant’s request for a psychological examination is
unnecessary.” (R., p.138.) Thus, the district court denied Ms. Christofferson’s request
for additional defense services. (R., p.138.)
Ms. Christofferson’s I.C. § 19-2524 screening was completed soon after the
district court denied her request for additional defense services. (See PSI, pp.47-49;
Tr., p.88, L.11 – p.89, L.12.) The screening reflected that Ms. Christofferson had a
diagnosis of “Major Depressive Disorder,” as well as “Generalized Anxiety Disorder” and
“Rule Out – Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder or other disorder of
extreme stress.” (PSI, p.47.) Major depressive disorder was a “serious mental illness”
that required the Department of Correction to refer her to the Department of Health and
Welfare for a full mental health examination.

See I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a) & (c)(iii);

IDAPA 16.07.33.011.10. However, Ms. Christofferson never went through the required
full mental health evaluation. (See Tr., p.73, L.9 – p.75, L.2, p.96, Ls.12-16.)

4

At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a
unified sentence of ten years, with seven years fixed. (Tr., p.60, L.21 – p.61, L.9.)
Ms. Christofferson recommended the district court impose a unified sentence of five
years, with one year fixed, suspend the sentence, and place her on probation.
(Tr., p.84, Ls.6-20.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed. (R., pp.153-58.)
Ms. Christofferson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Minute
Entry & Order – Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.159-61.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Christofferson’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 12.2 Motion For Additional Defense Services
A.

Introduction
Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied

her Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services. The district court
denied the Rule 12.2 motion after determining the services requested would be
duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and possible mental health examination that
had already been ordered. (R., pp.136, 138.) However, the psychological examination
services requested by Ms. Christofferson were not duplicative of the Section 19-2524
screening and mental health examination, because the requested psychological
examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in preparing for sentencing. In contrast,
the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination were mainly to benefit
the district court. Because the district court did not recognize this distinction, it did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Thus, the district court abused its
discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion. The State will be
unable to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s
denial of the Rule 12.2 motion was harmless.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[A] denial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be disturbed

absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a decision which
is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the case.” State v. Olin,
103 Idaho 391, 395 (1982). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the

7

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether the district court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the district court acted within the
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
to specific choices, and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989); see State v. Brown, 121 Idaho
385, 392 (1992) (applying Hedger to a defendant’s request for expert assistance).
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because It Did Not Act Consistently With
The Applicable Legal Standards
Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied

her Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services, because the district court did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Under the constitutional standards
for providing additional defense services, as implemented by Rule 12.2, the provision of
assistance at public expense is required where necessary for a fair trial and a
meaningful opportunity to present a defense.

Thus, contrary to the district court’s

determination, the psychological examination services requested by Ms. Christofferson
were not duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health examination,
because the requested psychological examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in
preparing for sentencing. Conversely, the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health
examination were mainly for the benefit of the district court. Because the district court
did not recognize this distinction, it did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards.

8

1.

The Constitutional Standards For Providing Additional Defense Services
Are Applicable Here

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Christofferson asserts the constitutional standards
for providing additional services are applicable in this case. Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2
governs motions requesting additional defense services. As the Legal Counsel for the
Idaho Supreme Court has written, “Rule 12.2 provides specific procedures and
guidelines for implementing” the requirements from State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391 (1982),
and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Michael Henderson, Idaho Criminal Rule
12.2: Guidance for Obtaining Necessary Defense Resources, 57 The Advocate, Official
Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Nov./Dec. 2014 at 34, 35.
In Olin, the Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 19-852(a)4 “recognizes that
there are cases where a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial may be jeopardized
unless there is access not only to an attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the
preparation of a defense.” Olin, 103 Idaho at 394. The Olin Court wrote, “[i]ncluded
4

At the time of the defendant’s trial in Olin, I.C. § 19-852(a) provided the following:
19-852. RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF NEEDY PERSON-REPRESENTATION
AT ALL STAGES OF CRIMINAL AND COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGSPAYMENT.-(a) A needy person who is being detained by a law
enforcement officer, or who is under formal charge of having committed,
or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled:
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person
having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of
representation (including investigation and other preparation). The
attorney, services, and facilities and the court costs shall be provided at
public expense to the extent that the person is, at the time the court
determines need, unable to provide for their payment.

Olin, 103 Idaho at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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within the scope of I.C. s 19-852(a) are the fourteenth amendment requirements of due
process and equal protection as they apply to indigent defendants.” Id. The Olin Court
then discussed how “the United States Supreme Court made it clear that ‘state(s) must,
as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an
adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price for other
prisoners.’” Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). The Olin
Court also noted, “[i]t is equally evident that if a defendant is denied access to the basic
tools of an adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process right of a
fair trial.” Id. (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). However, “[t]he constitution
does not require a state to provide expert or investigative assistance merely because a
defendant requests it.” Id.
The Olin Court explained “a defendant’s request for expert or investigative
services should be reviewed in light of all the circumstances and be measures against
the standard of ‘fundamental fairness’ embodied in the due process clause.” Id. Thus,
“[b]efore authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a particular purpose in an
indigent’s defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are necessary in
the interest of justice.” Id. at 395. The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the above
standards from Olin in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65 (2003), and State v. Dunlap,
155 Idaho 345, 381-82 (2013). State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 419 (2015).
Three years after the Idaho Supreme Court decided Olin, the United States
Supreme Court in Ake similarly stated, “[t]his Court has long recognized that when a
State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding,
it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his
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defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 76. The Ake Court wrote, “[t]his elementary principle,
grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply
as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.” Id. The United
States Supreme Court had “recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse
doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense.” Id. at 77.
In the context of a capital murder case, the Ake Court addressed “whether, and
under what conditions, the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to
preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with
access to competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense.” See id. at 77.
The Ake Court identified three relevant factors: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the action of the State,” (2) “the governmental interest that will be affected if
the safeguard is to be provided,” and (3) “the probable value of the additional or
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the affected interest in those safeguards are not provided.” Id.
On the three factors, the Ake Court stated “[t]he private interest in the accuracy
of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is almost
uniquely compelling.”

Id. at 78.

Conversely, the Ake Court concluded “the

governmental interest in denying Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial,
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in light of the compelling interest of both the State and the individual in accurate
dispositions.” Id.
As for the probable value of the psychiatric assistance sought, and the risk of
error if such assistance were not offered, the Ake Court recognized “that when the State
has made the defendant’s mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the
punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the
defendant’s ability to marsh his defense.” Id. at 80. The Ake Court also recognized that
“[p]sychiatry is not . . . an exact science,” and factfinders must often “resolve differences
in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence offered by each
party.” See id. at 81. The Ake Court concluded that, “without the assistance of a
psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to
help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to
assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of
an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.” Id. at 82. However, “[w]ith
such assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough information to
the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to make a sensible determination.” Id.
Thus, the Ake Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge
that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.” Id. at 83. The Ake Court noted an indigent defendant did
not have “a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to
receive funds to hire his own.” See id. The Ake Court also held, “in the context of a

12

capital sentencing proceeding, when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the
defendant’s future dangerousness,” that “due process requires access to a psychiatric
examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in
preparation at the sentencing phase.” Id. at 83-84.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held “[t]here is little to no substantive difference
between the Ake standards and this Court’s standards in Olin, Lovelace, and Dunlap.”
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 420 (citing State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2008)).
Although Ake and the Idaho Supreme Court’s cases articulate the test differently, “each
of these cases requires the provision of assistance at public expense where is it
necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, while sifting
out requests for services that are not shown to be reasonably necessary for these
purposes.” Id. (citing Martin, 146 Idaho at 363).
The Legal Counsel for the Idaho Supreme Court has explained “Rule 12.2 is
intended to guide this process of distinguishing meritorious requests for necessary
resources from unsupported or unnecessary requests.” Henderson, 57 The Advocate
Nov./Dec. 2014, at 36. Under Rule 12.2, “[a] defendant may submit a motion seeking
public funds for pay for investigative, expert, or other services that he believes to be
necessary for his defense.

The motion must be made in advance of the defense

incurring the costs and requires prior approval of the court.” I.C.R. 12.2(a). The rule
also contains a list of required information for the motion. I.C.R. 12.2(b). Rule 12.2
further states, “[t]he court shall decide the motion on the basis of the record in the case
and the information submitted by the defendant.” I.C.R. 12.2(d).

13

In light of the above, Ms. Christofferson submits the constitutional standards from
Olin and Ake are applicable here. Before Rule 12.2, Idaho’s appellate courts applied
the Olin and Ake standards to requests for additional defense services in noncapital
cases. See State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 392 (1992) (holding under Olin, in a rape,
robbery, and aggravated battery case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendant’s request to be examined by an expert of his choice regarding
his mental capacity, where the defendant had already been examined by a psychologist
and a psychiatrist); Martin, 146 Idaho at 359, 361-64 (holding under Olin and Ake, in a
possession of methamphetamine case, the district court did not err in denying the
defendant’s request for testing the physical evidence).
Idaho’s appellate courts have also applied Olin to requests for additional defense
services in the context of sentencing or other post-judgment proceedings. See Brown,
121 Idaho at 387, 392 (sentencing); State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491-92 (Ct. App.
1999) (addressing the district court’s denial of the defendant’s request for “post-trial
investigative services” to assist with preparation of the defendant’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 29 motion for acquittal).
Thus, because Idaho’s appellate courts have applied the Olin and Ake standards
to noncapital cases and sentencing proceedings, and “Rule 12.2 provides specific
procedures and guidelines for implementing the Olin and Ake requirements,” see
Henderson, 57 The Advocate Nov./Dec. 2014, at 35, Ms. Christofferson submits the
Olin and Ake constitutional standards are applicable to the circumstances here, namely
a sentencing proceeding in a noncapital case.

14

2.

The Psychological Examination Services Requested By Ms. Christofferson
Were Not Duplicative Of The I.C. § 19-2524 Screening And Mental Health
Examination

Ms. Christofferson asserts the psychological examination services she requested
were not duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health examination,
because the requested psychological examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in
preparing for sentencing. The expert assistance services contemplated by Olin and Ake
and now administered through Rule 12.2 are intended to aid the defendant in preparing
her defense. In contrast, the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination
are mainly for the benefit of the district court.
The expert assistance services contemplated by Olin and Ake and now
administered through Rule 12.2 are intended to aid the defendant in preparing
her defense. In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that once a defendant
made the threshold showing his sanity at the time of the offense was to be a significant
factor at trial, the State must “assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist
who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. The Ake Court also held, with
respect to a capital sentencing proceeding where the State presented psychiatric
evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness, that “due process requires access to
a psychiatric examination on relevant issue, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to
assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.” Id. at 83-84.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Olin similarly held that I.C. § 19-852(a) “recognizes
that there are cases where a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial may be jeopardized
unless there is access not only to an attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the
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preparation of a defense.” Olin, 103 Idaho at 394. Thus, the expert assistance services
administered through Rule 12.2, see Henderson, 57 The Advocate Nov./Dec. 2014, at
35, are intended to aid the defendant in preparing her defense.
In contrast, the screening and mental health examination contemplated by
I.C. § 19-2524 are not primarily intended to aid the defendant in preparing a defense.
Rather, the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination are mainly for
the benefit of the district court. The district court in this case said as much at the
sentencing hearing, stating “[t]he purpose of the screening and, ultimately, an
evaluation whether its’s a substance abuse or a mental health evaluation is to help the
Court with purposes of sentencing here.” (Tr., Feb. 26, 2016, p.96, Ls.3-7.)
For example, I.C. § 19-2524 provides “a screening to determine whether a
defendant is in need of a substance use disorder assessment and/or a mental health
examination shall be made in every felony case unless the court waives the requirement
for a screening.” I.C. § 19-2524(1)(a). The fact that the district court, not the defendant,
may waive the Section 19-2524 screening indicates the screening is focused on the
interests of the district court in crafting a sentence, not the defendant in preparing
a defense.
Further, Section 19-2524 indicates the mental health examination is likewise
focused on the interests of the district court. If the screening indicates that “a serious
mental illness may be present”, the statute requires the Department of Correction to
refer the defendant to the Department of Health and Welfare “for further examination.”
I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a). Once the mental health examination is complete, “the court shall
be provided, as part of the presentence report or other department of health and welfare
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report to the court, a copy of the mental health assessment along with a summary
report.” I.C. § 19-2524(3)(c).
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a presentence report, fundamentally,
“is used to assist the ‘court in individualizing a rational sentence for the defendant.’”
State v. Romero, 116 Idaho 391, 393 (1989) (quoting Idaho Judge’s Sentencing
Manual, § 5.52) (emphasis in original). The Romero Court wrote of “the compelling
need for information about the defendant at sentencing . . . .” Id. The Romero Court
declared that without the “crucial information” provided in such sources as a
presentence report, “it is impossible for a sentencing court to make an informed
decision necessary to promote” the four goals of sentencing. Id. at 396; see State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 569 (Ct. App. 1982). Thus the inclusion of the Section 19-2524
mental health examination in the presentence report indicates the mental health
examination, if one is performed, is also mainly for the benefit of the district court.5
Perhaps most importantly, Section 19-2524 is limited in scope and only
mandates the screening and (if required) mental health examination of a defendant.
The statute does not provide for any of the other services included in the Olin and Ake
standards. See generally I.C. § 19-2524. A Section 19-2524 screening evaluator or
mental health evaluator “would not assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
the defense,” see Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, nor would the evaluator furnish “certain
specialized aid in the preparation of a defense.” See Olin, 103 Idaho at 394.

Idaho Criminal Rule 32 provides that the contents of a presentence report shall include
“any report prepared pursuant to . . . I.C. § 19-2524.” I.C.R. 32(b)(10). If the screening
constitutes a report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, this assertion would also apply
to the screening.

5
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Some courts in other jurisdictions have held merely having a “neutral” expert
examine the defendant without providing further assistance is insufficient to meet the
requirements of Ake. See, e.g., State v. Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d 390, 395 (N.C. 1986)
(“What is required, as Ake makes clear, is that defendant be furnished with a competent
psychiatrist for the purpose of not only examining defendant but also assisting
defendant in evaluating, preparing, and presenting his defense in both the guilt and
sentencing phases.”); Lindsey v. State, 330 S.E.2d 563, 567 (Ga. 1985) (“[I]n additional
to examining the defendant, the psychiatrist must assist the defense by aiding defense
counsel in the cross-examination and rebuttal of the state’s medical experts.”); De
Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1993) (“In an adversarial
system due process requires at least a reasonably level playing field at trial. In the
present context that means more than just an examination by a ‘neutral’ psychiatrist.”).
But see Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 192 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Availability of a neutral
expert provides defendants with ‘the raw materials integral to the building of an
effective defense.”).
Section 19-2524 does not provide for an evaluator to render any assistance to a
defendant in evaluating, preparing, and presenting her defense.

See generally

I.C. § 19-2524. Thus, the limited scope of the statute shows the screening and mental
health examination contemplated by I.C. § 19-2524 are not primarily intended to aid the
defendant in preparing a defense.
Here, Ms. Christofferson requested a psychological examination to assist her in
preparing for sentencing.

Unlike the requested psychological examination, the

I.C. § 19-2524 screening performed in this case was mainly for the benefit of the district
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court. Thus, the psychological examination services requested by Ms. Christofferson
were not duplicative of the Section 19-2524 screening (and possible mental health
examination, which was not performed). Because the district court did not recognize
this distinction, it abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2
motion by not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115
Idaho at 598.
D.

The State Will Be Unable To Meet Its Burden Of Proving Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt The District Court’s Denial Of Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 Motion
Was Harmless
Ms. Christofferson asserts the State will be unable to meet its burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s denial of her Rule 12.2 motion was
harmless. Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

See

In the context of decisions related to

sentencing, the State has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt the error
did not contribute to the sentence imposed. See State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 363
(2013) (holding, in a capital case, that upon a showing of preserved error by a
defendant, “the State has the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not contribute to the death sentence.” (footnote omitted)).
The State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court’s denial of Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion did not contribute to the
sentence imposed. Even though Ms. Christofferson had a “serious mental illness” that
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required the Department of Correction to refer her for a full mental health evaluation,
she never went through one. (See PSI, p.47; Tr., p.73, L.9 – p.75, L.2, p.96, Ls.12-16.)
Thus, without the requested psychological examination services, Ms. Christofferson was
unable to articulate the full extent of her mental health issues for sentencing. At the
sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained what was missing in the context of
I.C. § 19-2425(c):
Report, written report, there is supposed to be a description and nature of
the exam. Well, since there wasn’t an exam, that wasn’t included. Again,
a multiaxial diagnosis that wasn’t included.
A description of the
defendant’s diagnosis, including PTSD, especially when there is a serious
mental illness involved, which there is. That wasn’t included. There was
no analysis of the percentage of impairment. There is no consideration of
the risk of taking this defendant may create for the public. We don’t know
any of that because it wasn’t included, even though our State Legislature
has mandated that this is to be included.
(Tr., Feb. 26, 2016, p.75, Ls.3-17.)

Defense counsel submitted “that sentencing

Ms. Christofferson on the sparse information currently before us would be a mistake of
law.” (Tr., Feb. 26, 2016, p.76, Ls.13-14.)
Even though the I.C. § 19-2524 screening stated Ms. Christofferson had
diagnoses of “Major Depressive Disorder,” “Generalized Anxiety Disorder,” and “Rule
Out – Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder or other disorder of
extreme stress” (PSI, p.47), the Section 19-2524 screening did not necessarily reflect
the full extent of her mental health issues. As the United States Supreme Court in Ake
recognized, “[p]sychiatry is not . . . an exact science.” See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81. The
Ake Court stated “psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently . . . on the appropriate
diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms . . . .”

Id. Thus, a full

psychological examination as requested could have resulted in different, potentially

20

more-accurate diagnoses, such as going beyond the preliminary “Rule Out” diagnoses
of the screening to determine whether Ms. Christofferson suffered from posttraumatic
stress disorder or acute stress disorder. See United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 593
n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A ‘rule out’ diagnosis, according to Dr. Pietz’s testimony, means
there is ‘evidence that [the patient] may meet the criteria for that diagnosis, but [the
doctors] need more information to rule it out.’”). But without the requested psychological
examination services, Ms. Christofferson was unable to articulate the full extent of her
mental health issues.
Further, the requested psychological examination services could have also
provided Ms. Christofferson with assistance in evaluating, preparing, and presenting her
defense at sentencing. See Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d at 395. As indicated above, the
Section 19-2524 mental health screening simply did not provide Ms. Christofferson with
such assistance. See generally I.C. § 19-2524. Thus, the State will be unable to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s denial of Ms. Christofferson’s
Rule 12.2 motion did not contribute to the sentence imposed.
Because the district court abused its discretion, Ms. Christofferson’s judgment of
conviction should be vacated, the district court order’s denying her Rule 12.2 motion
should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for the district court to decide the
Rule 12.2 motion using the applicable legal standards.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Christofferson respectfully requests this Court vacate
her judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying her Rule 12.2
motion, and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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